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Summary 
It is well known that the exit of any country out of EMU would have an extremely destabilizing effect on all the 
euro zone countries as well as an extremely negative impact on their economy. However this hypothesis is often 
talked about without thinking of the real legal and practical consequences it could have. So it is important to 
enlighten  the  debate  in  an  analytical  way  so  that  this  kind  of  supposition  is  discussed  taking  the  right 
implications into account. 
For a country wanting to abandon the euro the only legal way possible following the European treaty regulations 
would be to leave the whole of EU using article 50 of the treaty and then try to rejoin but asking for special 
dispensation with regards to the monetary union. Another legal way would be to negotiate an amendment to the 
treaty with other member countries. All these options require long negotiations and ratification by all member 
states. Some people therefore think that, because of urgency, only a unanimous agreement by the European 
Council leading to the issue of a European regulation, could be sufficient despite the legal uncertainty that this 
could entail. Some articles from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could also be used when a 
country wants to leave the euro zone without leaving the UE, as long as it is accepted that international public 
law applies to the European treaty, which is however a much debated issue. 
The difficulties related to the abandon of the euro by only one country (or a subset of countries) in the EMU 
arise because the other countries would keep the euro. The new currency of the country leaving the EMU will 
have to coexist with its old currency, the euro, that would be kept by the other countries. It must therefore not be 
taken for granted that any debt that the country had in Euros would be converted automatically to their new 
currency. This situation would be even more critical if the new currency was expected to depreciate and become 
worth less than its initial conversion rate with the euro. 
A description of the procedures to be undertaken by a country when wanting to leave the euro zone allows you to 
measure the difficulties that you may come across in the process. A crucial question is how to undo the euro 
denominated debts and claims of  the country’s national central bank to or on the other national central banks in 
the Euro System, including  the European Central Bank. To avoid a panic and too strong devaluation in the new 
national  currency  value,  the  saving  accounts  could  be  temporarily  blocked.  Moreover,  contrary  to  the  free 
circulation of capital in the EU, temporary measures of capital movements control may be taken even though this 
may be illegal under the European treaty. 
In the hypothesis of a state wanting to leave the euro zone, it would only be under certain conditions that certain 
debts that would have been issued in euros by either a public or private institution of the country before the date 
of exit, or certain payments deriving from contracts in euro’s settled before this date, could be automatically 
converted into the new currency at the initial conversion rate. In general such a conversion could only apply to 
debts and contracts for which the involved contractors intended to refer to the “lex monetae” of the leaving 
country. 
However if the withdrawal is unilateral, thus illegal according to the European treaty, courts located in other 
countries than the country leaving the euro, would probably refuse the right to convert any debts and contracts 
into the new national currency if they were to be taken to court. IESEG Working Paper Series 2011-ECO-06 
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1 Introduction 
It is well known that the exit of any member country out of the European Monetary Union 
could have an extremely destabilizing effect on the whole  euro zone as well as having a 
strong  negative  impact  on  the  economy  in  all  the  euro  zone  countries.  Nevertheless  this 
hypothesis is often discussed without considering what it would imply in practice. Therefore 
it is very important to discuss this subject scientifically so that this kind of supposition is 
discussed taking the right implications into account. The purpose of this paper is to describe 
how  an  exit  from  the  euro  could  be  organized  in  practice,  and  what  could  be  the  legal 
foundations of such a withdrawal.  For an assessment of the economic consequences of a 
breakup of the euro area, see Eichengreen (2007). 
This article thus begins with an examination of what could be the legal foundations of a 
decision to leave the euro by a country of the EMU. It will then describe the problems that 
would be encountered because the new national currency of the country leaving EMU would 
coexist with its old monetary unit, the euro, which would indeed be kept as the currency of the 
other  member  states  remaining  in  EMU.  The  description  of  the  potential  procedures  if 
wanting to leave the euro zone allows us to understand the complexity and incertitude of such 
a project. In the hypothesis of a country leaving the euro zone, one can also determine in 
which cases debts or other financial obligations taken out in euros before leaving the zone 
may be converted to the new currency. 
 
2 Legal foundations of a decision to leave the euro zone 
The Lisbon treaty contains a clause that allows a member of the European Union to leave it as 
a whole. It is article 50 of the consolidated version of the European Union Treaty, mentioning 
that any member state may decide to leave the European Union and that they must negotiate 
and come up with an agreement fixing the procedures of their withdrawal. 
However the treaty does not have a clause that allows a country to leave the euro zone but at 
the same time remain a member of the European Union. For a country wanting to abandon the 
euro, the only legal way at the moment, if the Treaty has to be fully respected, would be to 
leave the UE using article 50. The country could then negotiate re-entering the UE without 
taking on the Euro currency (For example the UK  benefits of such a dispensation at the 
moment).  This  process  would  be  political  risky  as  a  new  adhesion  to  the  UE  demands 
ratification by all the member states. 
International law however allows other legal routes to be used, even if uncertain. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties contains certain articles that define reasons authorizing a 
state to denounce an international treaty, suspend or even withdraw their application even if 
the treaty does not state the latter. Once again these articles are based on denouncing the IESEG Working Paper Series 2011-ECO-06 
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whole international treaty concerned. Article 44 of the Vienna convention however defines 
certain conditions that a state can use to denounce some of the clauses of an international 
treaty whilst still keeping some part. 
In order to do this, the clauses must be able to be separated from the rest of the international 
treaty as far as their execution is concerned, and it must be established that acceptation of the 
clauses in question by the state did not constitute for the other nations an essential reason why 
they accepted to be tied to the whole treaty. As some member states of the EU are already 
dispensed (like the UK) from having the Euro currency a member state could suggest that the 
clauses of the European treaty linked to the EMU may be separated from the rest of the treaty. 
We must now examine what the causes of withdrawal described in the Vienna Convention are 
that could be used to justify the right for a State to withdraw from clauses of the treaty of the 
UE  that  concern  the  EMU.  Article  62  of  the  Vienna  convention  allows  you  to  justify 
withdrawal by fundamental changes in circumstances compared to those that prevailed at the 
time the treaty was written, whilst these circumstances constituted an essential base in order to 
adhere to the treaty and that the change radically transforms any obligations that come from it. 
Greece could say that the loss of competitiveness in their economy due to the strong euro 
currency and the recession it is going through, has totally changed their balance between the 
advantages  and  disadvantages  in  their  being  part  of  the  euro  zone.  The  change  in 
circumstances must not be due to the violation by the concerned State of certain clauses in the 
treaty. Greece’s European partners could say that the austerity it is going through is partially 
due to lack of respect of their pact of stability in the past. Article 61 of the Vienna convention 
allows  you  to  justify  a  unilateral  withdrawal  by  the  impossibility  of  keeping  certain 
obligations  of  the  treaty.  Greece  could  state  that  the  evolution  of  the  macroeconomic 
conditions no longer allows the country to respect all the obligations that it must adhere to by 
being a member of the EMU. It is obvious that the acceptance of these different arguments 
from their European counterparts is uncertain. 
Another uncertainty comes from the fact that certain Member States, such as France, Malta 
and Romania have not ratified the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Moreover some specialists do not agree with the applicability of the Vienna Convention to the 
UE treaty. Some lawyers even suggest that the very nature of community law is very different 
to international public law. The ECB of course privileges this point of view, see Atanasiou 
(2009). However these others seem to be contradicted by the facts. Indeed several rulings of 
the  European  courts  like  the  Court  of  first  Instance  admit  themselves  that  the  Vienna 
Convention is to be applied in a Community context. Examples are provided by Proctor and 
Thieffry (1998) and by Wouters and Van Eeckhoutte (2002). 
The most secure and legal method for a country to leave the euro zone without leaving the EU 
is to negotiate an amendment on the EU treaty. It is a theoretical but unrealistic hypothesis as 
the process would be lengthy and during the process other member countries would be fierce IESEG Working Paper Series 2011-ECO-06 
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and bitter towards those wanting to quit the euro zone. The countries willing to leave the 
Monetary Union would certainly experience a bank run and huge flight of capital. 
As a consequence, certain analysts say that in a situation of urgency, European leaders could 
be  happy  with  a  political  agreement  at  the  Council,  followed  by  the  issue  of  a  simple 
European  regulation,  but  this  infringement  in  the  treaty  would  open  a  period  of  legal 
uncertainty and could be the target of lots of complaints in front of courts. 
Whilst one can envisage a well thought out negotiated withdrawal of a member State with the 
agreement  of  the  other  members,  the  hypothesis  of  a  unilateral  withdraw  would  be  an 
infringement to the treaty and could be legally dangerous for the State concerned. In particular 
the State concerned would be exposing itself to legal recourses in trying to convert its debts 
denominated in Euros into the new national currency. 
 
3 The main source of problems related to the abandonment of the Euro by a 
member State. 
The very particular difficulties related to an abandonment of the euro by a member State are 
due to the fact that other countries of the Euro zone would keep the euro as their currency 
even if a member State wishes to leave. The new currency of the country leaving the EMU 
must then coexist alongside its old currency, the euro, which would remain the currency of the 
other countries. 
During  the  monetary  separation  of  Slovakia  and  the  Czech  Republic,  Czechoslovakia’s 
currency lost all its legal value and paved the way for new currencies. So Slovakians and the 
Czech had to convert their currency to the new monetary units using the official conversion 
rate as the old currency was losing its value everywhere. As the currency of Czechoslovakia 
was going to disappear, we could not contest the automatic conversion of all contracts and 
debt into either of the new currencies. 
If Greece or another country were to introduce a new currency, a new Drachmae for example, 
and abandon the euro, this would continue to have value as a currency of other countries in 
the  EMU.  There  is  one  main  question:  can  the  old  contracts  and  debts  in  euros  be 
automatically converted to the new currency (new drachmae) in this case or will the receivers 
take payments only in euros seeing as it still exists. Matters become extremely difficult when 
it is forecasted that the new national currency, the new Drachmae for example, will lose value 
quickly compared to the euro. Indeed the borrowers would prefer to redenominate the debts in 
the new currency, while the lenders would demand to keep them in euro.  
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4 A practical guide for a withdrawal from the euro zone 
In the hypothesis of a state deciding to unilaterally withdraw from the EMU, despite the legal 
risks entailed, the procedure could be as here below. This description focuses on essential 
points and therefore neglects lots of technical details, each of which would deserve a separate 
paper and require very long explications. 
In  what  follows  the  country  that  leaves  the  euro  zone,  Greece  for  example  is  called 
secessionist and the banks of this departing country, Greek banks in the same example are 
called the domestic banks. 
-  The government of the secessionist country would freeze the euro reserve accounts of 
the domestic banks at the national central bank of the country with the exception of the 
part of their balance that represents reserves corresponding to bank deposits of non- 
residents. 
-  These frozen euro reserve accounts balances of the domestic commercial banks at the 
national  central  bank  of  the  secessionist  country,  would  be  converted  into  a  new 
currency at a rate of 1:1 (1 EURO = 1 UNIT of the new currency). 
-  Outstanding loans in euro’s formerly granted by the secessionist national central bank 
to the domestic banks, in application of the monetary operations framework of the 
Eurosystem or under other mechanisms like Emergency Liquidity Assistance, will also 
be converted into the new national currency at the prescribed conversion rate. 
-  A law will set  up a new operational  framework for the national  monetary policy, 
enabling the national  central  bank to  provide liquidity in  the new  currency to  the 
domestic  banks.  This  framework  can  differ  from  the  ECB  rules,  and  for  example 
authorize  the  national  central  bank  to  directly  lend  money  to  the  government  or 
purchase sovereign bonds on the primary market. The monetary policy rates would 
also be set independently of the ECB. 
-  The  euro  accounts  of  the  residents  in  the  domestic  banks  would  immediately  be 
converted into the new national currency on the same ratio of 1 EURO = 1 unit of the 
new national currency. 
-  The euro accounts of non-residents in the domestic banks would remain in euro’s 
which would now be considered as a foreign currency in the departing country.  
-  Banks  of  the  departing  country  would  be  temporarily  prohibited  from  transferring 
balances from the residents’ accounts denominated in the new national currency into 
new euro denominated bank accounts that they would open, or to euro denominated 
bank accounts of non-residents. 
-  All debts resulting from contracts between residents of the departing country, such as 
loans, salaries, rent or even bills that are due to be paid would be converted to the new 
national currency at the initial rate of 1:1. 
-  A foreign exchange market would open, where the new national currency could be 
traded against the euro and other currencies. One could think that the new currency 
would depreciate rapidly, the value of the new currency falling much below one euro. IESEG Working Paper Series 2011-ECO-06 
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-  In order to avoid a panic with a bank run and a too strong devaluation of the new 
currency,  domestic  bank  saving  accounts  converted  in  the  new  currency  could  be 
temporarily frozen. 
-  Moreover contrary to the law of free circulation of capital within the EU, temporary 
measures controlling capital circulation could be taken but the legality of doing this 
would remain uncertain.  
-  The government of the departing country would oblige all domestic shops to take all 
payments in cash in the new currency. This would also be applied to debit and credit 
card payments or any other electronic transactions. 
-  Whilst waiting for the printing of new banknotes denominated in the new national 
currency,  banknotes  denominated  in  euro’s  may  still  be  used  temporarily  in  the 
departing country, but will be stamped in order to indicate that their facial values 
represent values in the new currency. 
-  During this transition period euro notes given over the counter by domestic banks or 
taken from ATM machines will have been stamped beforehand indicating that their 
facial  value  is  now  expressed  in  the  new  currency  and  no  more  in  euro’s.  These 
stamped banknotes would only be a lawful mean of payment in the departing country. 
Only stamped notes will be accepted as lawful banknotes in the new national currency 
until the new banknotes have been printed. 
-  Currency offices will be opened all over the country for a few days so that residents 
may go and ask for their outstanding euro banknotes to be stamped whilst waiting for 
the new notes. For most people the outstanding stock of banknotes is very limited. 
One could say that this is not necessary as you can identify on the euro notes those that 
have been issued by the national central bank of the departing country, but in reality 
this is not true. The identity of the national central bank who had the responsibility for 
producing a euro note is marked by a letter that precedes the serial number. However 
this does not mean that the national central bank is the «issuer» of the notes. As these 
notes circulate indifferently in all the Monetary Union it is anyway not imaginable that 
it  is  this  identification  that  determines  which  notes  will  be  converted  to  the  new 
national  currency.  This  would  greatly  penalize  the  non-residents  who  would  hold 
banknotes “issued” by the departing country. The best solution would therefore be to 
stamp  the  euro  notes  held  by  the  residents  of  the  departing  country  concerned 
regardless  of  the  national  central  bank  that  they  were  issued  in.  Of  course,  when 
considering the perspectives of devaluation of the new local currency, many residents 
of the country asking to quit the euro zone would prefer their stock of euro banknotes 
not to be stamped so that they can sell them later and get a better exchange rate. 
-  Once the new banknotes are printed, the residents of the departing country would have 
a few days to exchange their stamped banknotes in euro (but representing values in the 
new currency) against new notes denominated in the new currency.  All the stamped 
euro denominated banknotes would thus be withdrawn.  
-  A new agreement between the country wanting to flee the euro zone and others from 
the EMU would explain the way that debt in euros would be dealt with considering in IESEG Working Paper Series 2011-ECO-06 
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this process the other national banks of the Euro System and Central Bank of Europe. 
This problematic represents great difficulties and uncertainties that would discourage 
those wanting to quit the euro zone. 
-  What would the monetary status of the enormous debts of the national central bank be 
towards other national banks in the Euro System? Leaving them the Euro could result 
in the bankruptcy of the national central bank wanting to quit, especially in the case of 
a strong devaluation of the new currency compared to the euro. But to convert them to 
the new devalued currency could result in tremendous losses for the other national 
central banks and their States. 
-  A typical national central bank of EMU holds several intra-Eurosystem claims among 
the  assets  of  its  balance  sheet.  The  departing  country  should  negotiate  with  the 
remaining members of EMU what these claims would become.   
a)  The participating interest of the national central bank in the capital of 
the ECB could be bought back by this institution, the capital of which would 
thus decrease. Another solution would be that this participation be bought by 
the  remaining  members  of  the  zone.  The  national  central  banks  of  these 
remaining countries would thus increase their holding of shares of the capital 
of the ECB in proportion of their existing weight in the capital subscribed by 
the remaining NCB’s of the Eurosystem. Such solutions would simply require 
a decision of the Council. The national central bank of the departing country 
could also keep its shares in the capital of the ECB. Indeed all the countries of 
the EU are currently shareholders of the ECB, even those who are out of the 
Eurosystem, because they all participate to the European System of Central 
Banks. 
b)  Normally the ECB should give back to the departing national central 
bank  the  reserves  that  had  been  transferred  by  this  bank  to  the  European 
monetary authorities when the country joined the euro zone. These reserves 
were transferred in the form of assets denominated in foreign currencies like 
USD and JPY and in the form of gold, against claims on the ECB, which are 
denominated in euro. The claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserves 
to the ECB, would thus be replaced by foreign reserves on the assets part of 
the balance sheet of the departing national central bank. The total foreign 
reserves of the ECB would thus decrease as a result. The ECB could also 
keep the initially transferred reserves among its assets, and the corresponding 
claim  of  the  departing  national  central  bank  would  now  be  considered  as 
foreign reserves of the leaving country. It may indeed be expected that the 
departing  national  central  bank  would  primarily  need  to  hold  reserves 
denominated in euro. Another advantage would be that the overall reserves of 
the ECB would not decrease. 
-  On  the  liabilities  part  of  the  balance  sheet  of  a  national  central  bank  of  the 
Eurosystem, the item «banknotes in circulation» is different from the actual value of 
banknotes that have been put in circulation by this central bank. Indeed this item is a IESEG Working Paper Series 2011-ECO-06 
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notional share of total euro banknotes in circulation, calculated on the basis of the 
banknote allocation key. The difference between the value of euro banknotes allocated 
to the NCB in accordance with the banknote allocation key and the value of the euro 
banknotes  that  it  actually  puts  into  circulation  gives  rise  to  a  corrective  item 
«Liabilities related to the allocation and of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem (net) 
» if the actual banknotes put in circulation by the NCB exceed its notional allocation. 
On the contrary the difference gives rise to a corrective balance sheet item « Claims 
related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem (net)» if the notional 
banknotes allocated to the ECB exceed the value of banknotes that this bank has put in 
circulation. Normally a big part of the euro banknotes formerly put in circulation by 
the  national  central  bank  of  the  departing  country  will  be  stamped  and  thereafter 
withdrawn  as  explained  above.  The  other  part  of  these  banknotes  will  remain  in 
circulation in the euro area. On the balance sheet of the national central bank of the 
departing country, it is thus likely that the former euro denominated items «banknotes 
in circulation» and «Claims or liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes 
within  the  Eurosystem  (net)»  will  be  replaced  by  a  liability  «New  banknotes  in 
circulation»  in  the  new  domestic  currency  and  an  additional  liability  to  the  ECB, 
expressed in euro and corresponding to the part of the formerly issued euro banknotes 
that will not have been withdrawn. This liability in euro will thus reduce the amount of 
euro reserves held by the national central bank of the departing country. 
-  The balance sheets of the national central banks of the distressed countries of the euro 
zone include a huge liability to the Eurosystem, which reflects the disequilibrium in 
the  TARGET2  balances.  This  balance  sheet  item  is  generally  identified  as  «  Net 
liabilities  related  to  transactions  with  the  ESCB  (TARGET2)  ».  These  large 
TARGET2  balances  result  from  capital  and  deposit  flight  out  of  the  distressed 
countries  towards  core  countries.  The  main  counterpart  of  these  liabilities  is  an 
extremely  large  claim  of  the  German  central  bank  on  the  Eurosystem,  related  to 
TARGET2 balances. These liabilities and claims on the ECB are of course expressed 
in  euro.  If it is  a distressed country which leaves  the  euro, the departing national 
central bank will thus be left with a very large euro denominated liability to the ECB, 
that it would not be able to reimburse. The problem would be aggravated by the likely 
appreciation of the euro. A default of the departing national central bank on this debt 
would cause huge losses to the ECB. Theses losses would be shared between all the 
remaining NCB’s of the EMU, in proportion of their participating shares in the capital 
of the ECB. In turn each of these NCB’s would have to be recapitalized by its own 
government. To avoid such losses for the taxpayers of the member countries, the ECB 
could  be  compelled  to  formally  grant  a  loan  of  the  same  amount  in  euro  to  the 
departing  central  bank,  despite  its  location  out  of  the  euro  zone,  and  to  renew  it 
indefinitely, or to spread the reimbursement over a very long time period. If a country 
like Germany is leaving the EMU, its central bank will be left with a huge claim in 
euro on the ECB. The German central bank will incur losses on this claim with the IESEG Working Paper Series 2011-ECO-06 
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likely appreciation of the new national currency relative to the euro. These losses will 
require an extremely large recapitalization by the German government.  
The practical difficulties of setting up the procedure of a country wanting to quit the euro 
zone are often minimized by those suggesting such a move.  From the above description of a 
likely  exit  scenario  it  is  difficult  to  expect  a  sudden  overnight  withdrawal  of  a  country. 
Several issues have to be negotiated in advance to avoid a dislocation of the financial markets. 
 
5 The continuity of contracts in euros and the status of debts in 
euros of the departing country. 
In the hypothesis of a state quitting the euro zone either unilaterally or after an agreement 
with  other  member  states  of  the  EMU,  you  have  to  decide  in  what  currency  must  the 
contractual obligations established in euros before leaving be put, involving public or private 
institutions of the departing country concerned. Must the repayments and interest to be paid 
for a debt taken out in euros by a public or private institution before quitting be paid in euros 
or in the new currency? In general terms is it in euro’s or in the new national currency that 
payments are due when they result from a contract established before the breakup, and for 
which at least one of the parties belongs to the departing country? In order to answer this 
question you need to determine what “lex monetae” did the parties want to refer to at the time 
the contract was issued. 
The right of a Sovereign country to regulate the status of its currency is managed by the “lex 
monetae” in international law. 
The principle of “lex monetae” stipulates that everything that concerns the currency of a 
country is legally managed by the state that issued it. An exhaustive coverage of this concept 
can  be  found  in  Proctor  (2005).  This  rule  is  universal  and  has  been  confirmed  by  the 
International Law Court. That is how Germany for example decided that its currency “the 
mark” would be replaced by a new currency named the euro from 1999. English courts could 
not contest that any contract governed by English law, established before 1999 and stipulating 
payment in marks, implied payments in euro’s after the launch of the EMU. The law of the 
contract, that is the English law, could not govern the issue of the replacement of the mark by 
the euro. When a state substitutes a new currency to its previous one, the replacement must be 
recognized by the other states and their courts. A contract governed by the law of a State but 
expressed in the currency of another State is governed by the “lex monetae” of this other State 
for anything that concerns the properties of the contract that are related to the currency. 
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6 The right to convert debt taken out in Euros before quitting the 
euro zone to the new currency. 
In the hypothesis of a country wanting to leave the EMU to reintroduce their own currency, 
the citizens or institutions of this country having previously taken out loans in euros may try 
to be given permission to reimburse their debt and pay the interest in their new currency. The 
creditors may contest this option in the courts of the country concerned or foreign courts. The 
courts, whether they are those of the secessionist country or of other countries, will determine 
whether the payments may be paid in the new currency or euros as a function of whether the 
different parties contracted by reference to the “lex monetae” of the departing country or that 
of another member state of the euro zone. 
As contracts do not normally mention the “lex monetae” that the parties refer to, the national 
or foreign courts try to determine which “lex monetae” the parties wanted to refer to at the 
moment the contract was taken out. Generally the law courts of the country quitting the EMU 
and those of other countries will assume that they referred to the “lex monetae” of the country 
departing in the following situations: 
-  A sovereign bond that had been issued in euro’s by the departing country, directed 
towards local investors,  not to be traded on  a foreign market and payable  in the 
country; 
-  A loan in euros that was agreed on to a debtor of the departing country by a bank of 
another country in the euro zone or out of the zone, and which stipulated that the 
repayments and interest were to be paid to a subsidiary of the lender in the debtor’s 
country. 
-  A loan in euro’s that was agreed on by a bank of the departing country, to a debtor of 
this country; 
-  A private or sovereign bond that had been issued in euro’s and that was traded from 
the start on the secondary market of the country wanting to quit; 
-  A debt based on a contract that was taken out in euros and governed by the law of the 
country wanting to quit or that stipulates that the payments were to be made in that 
country. 
The courts would then recognize and acknowledge the right of the borrowers to pay their 
debts and interest in the new currency of the departing State even though they were initially 
stated in euros. For a country quitting after an amendment of the treaty or any other agreement 
with  other  member  states,  the  rights  would  be  recognized  not  only  by  the  courts  of  the 
secessionist country but also by those of the foreign countries. 
In the case of a unilateral withdrawal, going against the European treaty, one could believe 
that only the courts of the country quitting would recognize the right to convert debts and 
repayments in the new national currency in the cases mentioned above. IESEG Working Paper Series 2011-ECO-06 
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Such a legal analysis shows that there are many cases where debt reimbursement and interest 
payments would have to remain in euro’s for example: 
-  A sovereign bond that had been issued in euro’s by the departing country and that was 
directed  to  international  investors,  that  is  traded  on  foreign  markets  or  is  payable 
abroad 
-  A loan granted in euro’s by a bank from another country in the euro zone or even out 
of the euro zone, to a debtor of the departing country, and providing for the borrower 
to pay to a euro account in the country of the lender. 
An  interesting  treatment  of  such  issues  is  proposed  by  Proctor  (2011),  Proctor  (2006), 
Thieffry and Proctor (1998), Thieffry (2011) and Proctor (2005, chapter 32). 
 
7 Conclusion 
There may be ways that a State may legally and above board quit the euro zone, but all of 
these would require lengthy negotiations and discussions, whose very existence would cause 
speculation making the application difficult. As far as a unilateral withdrawal is concerned it 
would expose the State concerned, to many recourses in front of national and foreign courts. 
If we assume that a state may withdraw from the euro zone, the procedures of a possible 
withdraw would cause many difficulties and uncertainties. In the same way a withdrawal from 
the euro zone does not automatically mean that all the contracts and loans etc…. may be 
converted to the new national currency. We have not discussed here other reforms of EMU 
that  are  sometimes  suggested,  like  the  proposal  of  Arghyrou  and  Tsoukalas  (2010)  to 
implement a two-currency EMU, with a strong euro for the core countries and a weak euro for 
the periphery countries, both managed by the ECB, with the bonds and external debt of the 
periphery countries staying in strong euro terms. However it must be pointed out that their 
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